The Radiation Oncology Job Market: The Economics and Policy of Workforce Regulation

Publication date: Available online 8 June 2016
Source:International Journal of Radiation Oncology*Biology*Physics
Author(s): Benjamin P. Falit, Hubert Y. Pan, Benjamin D. Smith, Brian M. Alexander, Anthony L. Zietman
Examinations of the US radiation oncology workforce offer inconsistent conclusions, but recent data raise significant concerns about an oversupply of physicians. Despite these concerns, residency slots continue to expand at an unprecedented pace. Employed radiation oncologists and professional corporations with weak contracts or loose ties to hospital administrators would be expected to suffer the greatest harm from an oversupply. The reduced cost of labor, however, would be expected to increase profitability for equipment owners, technology vendors and entrenched professional groups. Policymakers must recognize that the number of practicing radiation oncologists is a poor surrogate for clinical capacity. There is likely to be significant opportunity to augment capacity without increasing the number of radiation oncologists by improving clinic efficiency and offering targeted incentives for geographic redistribution. Payment policy changes significantly threaten radiation oncologist income, which may encourage physicians to care for greater patient loads, thereby obviating the need for more personnel. Furthermore, the implementation of alternative payment models such as Medicare's Oncology Care Model, threatens to decrease both the utilization and price of radiotherapy by turning referring providers into cost-conscious consumers. Medicare funds the vast majority of Graduate Medical Education, but it is unclear the extent to which the expansion in radiation oncology residency slots has been externally funded. Excess physician capacity carries a significant risk of harm to society by suboptimally allocating intellectual resources and creating comparative shortages in other, more needed disciplines. There are practical concerns associated with a market-based solution in which medical students self-regulate according to job availability, but antitrust law would likely forbid collaborative self-regulation that purports to restrict supply. Since Congress is unlikely to create one central body to govern residency controls for all specialties, we recommend better reporting of program-specific employment metrics and careful, intellectually honest re-evaluation of existing ACGME accreditation standards.



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